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Treppa: Education Law

THE EDUCATION FOR ALL HANDICAPPED
CHILDREN ACT: TRENDS AND PROBLEMS
WITH THE "RELATED SERVICES"
PROVISION
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Education for All Handicapped Children Act 1 (hereinafter the" Act") was designed to assure a "free appropriate public education" for all handicapped children. 2 The Act guarantees
federal funding 3 to assist state and local agencies in establishing
and maintaining individualized educational programs ("IEP's")4
for handicappedlj public school students. An IEP must outline
the educational goals of the child, as well as the instructional
methods and supplementary ("related") services used in meeting
1. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1461 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
2. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (Supp. 1986).
3. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1414 (1982).
4. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(19) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) provides:
The term 'individualized education program' means a written
statement for each handicapped child developed in any meeting by a representative of the local educational agency or an
intermediate educational unit who shall be qualified to provide, or supervise the provision of, specially designed instruction to meet the unique needs of handicapped children, the
teacher, the parents or guardian of such child, and, whenever
appropriate, such child, which statement shall include (A) a
statement of the present levels of educational performance of
such child, (B) a statement of annual goals, including short
term instructional objectives, (C) a statement of the specific
educational service to be provided to such child, and the extent to which such child will be able to participate in regular
educational programs, (D) the projected date for initiation and
anticipated duration of such services, and (E) appropriate objective criteria and evaluation procedures and schedules for
determining, on at least an annual basis, whether instructional
objectives are being achieved.
5. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(l) (Supp. III 1985) provides: "The term 'handicapped children' means mentally retarded, hard of hearing, deaf, speech or language impaired, visually handicapped, seriously emotionally disturbed, orthopedically impaired, or other
health impaired children, or children with specific learning disabilities, who by reason
thereof require special education and related services."
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the goals. 6
An IEP must be approved by the student's parent(s).7 If the
IEP is unacceptable, the parent may request what is commonly
referred to as a "due process hearing"8 with the local educational agency.9 If the hearing fails to resolve a dispute, the parent may ultimately commence an action in either state lO or federal courtll to determine the IEP's validity.
An integral factor in the success of an IEP is the availability
of "related services." Just as non-handicapped students may require bus transportation or the assistance of a school nurse,
handicapped students require unique services such as physical
therapy or speech instruction in order for them to take advantage of their educational opportunity.12 Because acceptable related services are provided without cost to the parents of handicapped students, the determination of what constitutes a related
service under the Act is critical. l3
The statutory definition of "related services" includes such
support services as limited medical care, physical and occupational therapy, as well as psychological counseling. a Transporta6. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(19) (Supp. III 1985).
7.Id.
8. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2) (1982). See also 20 U.S.C. § 1419 (1982). Each individual
state develops its own laws to govern the education of the handicapped, yet the "federal"
act must be complied with to obtain financial support.
9. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1982). The hearing ensures the following parental rights: 1) the
right to be represented by counsel and be aided by experts in this field, 2) the right to
present evidence and confront, cross examine, and compel the attendance of witnesses,
and 3) the right to appeal.
10. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1982).
11. Id. Note that suits regarding the availability of related services will not be determined under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1978: 29 U.S.C. section 794 (1982).
See Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984). However, Smith involved questions regarding the awarding of attorneys fees in a proceeding to ensure a free appropriate public
education for a handicapped child. For a detailed discussion regarding the procedural
safeguards, see Comment, The Education for All Handicapped Children Act Since 1975,
69 MARQ. L. REV. 51 (1985).
12. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400(b)-1400(c) (Supp. 1986).
13. Id.
14. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17) (1982):
The term 'related services' means transportation, and
such developmental, corrective, and other supportive services
(including speech pathology and audiology, psychological services, physical and occupational therapy, recreation, and medical and counselin'g services, except that such medical services
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tion is specifically required, IIi and some courts have found other
practical concerns such as housing expenses to be included. 16
This Comment will focus on the interpretation of related
services used in IEP's, and will address the significant shortcomings of the related services mandate: lack of clarity and insufficient funding. 17
II. THE HISTORY
CHILDREN

OF

EDUCATING

HANDICAPPED

Special education programs originated in the 1820'S.18 With
federal support yet to be established, students were dependent
solely on their families for practical and financial support. 19
From the early 1900's until the 1950's, federally funded programs were gradually emerging, but they were limited to specific
handicapped groups such as the deaf. 20 Therefore, in an effort to
publicize the needs of all handicapped students to lawmakers,
two special interest groups were formed: The National Association for Retarded Citizens (NARC)21 and The Council for Exceptional Children (CEC).22
In the early 1960's, NARC and CEC helped to increase public support for federally funded education for all handicapped
children. 23 As a result, the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act of 1965 (ESEA) was passed. 24 The ESEA resulted in limited
Federal administrative assistance in organizing and maintaining
special education programs. 211 However, it failed to provide the

15.
16.

17.
18.

shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only) as may
be required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from special education, and includes the early identification and assessment of handicapping conditions in children.
[d. See infra notes 94-102 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 103-09 and accompanying text.
20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1461 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
E. LEVINE & E. WEXLER, PUBLIC LAW 94-142: AN ACT OF CONGRESS, at 12 (1981).
[d. at 14.

19.
20. [d.
21. [d. at 15. NARC was established in 1950.
22. [d. at 16. While CEC was established in 1922, it did not obtain significant membership until 1950 when there were approximately 70,000 members. [d.
23. E. LEVINE & E. WEXLER, supra note 18, at 18.
24. Pub. L. No. 89-10, (1965).

25. In Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 181 (1982),
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supplemental services needed in order for most handicapped
children to take advantage of the special education programs. 28
The following year, Congress added Title VI: Education of
Handicapped Children to the ESEA. 27 In an attempt to improve
the level of education available, this Act established the Bureau
of Education for the Handicapped and the National Advisory
Committee on the Handicapped. 28 The amendment was the first
legislative act to result in federal funding for support services for
handicapped students. 29 The amendment, however, failed to set
specific guidelines for state use of the grant money.30
In 1970, Title VI of the ESEA was repealed when the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA) was adopted. 31 The EHA
authorized federal funding up to 1974, but again failed to specify
criteria for the use of the money.32 Moreover, the EHA failed to
dictate specific related services that would be available to handicapped students.
Between 1970 and 1975 three cases illustrated the increasing need for concrete statutory rules for educating handicapped
children. Two federal district court decisions 33 found a constitudiscussed infra notes 56-60 and accompanying text, the Court briefly reviewed the history of educational provisions for handicapped students.
26. E. LEVINE & E. WEXLER, PUBLIC LAW 94-142: AN ACT OF CONGRESS, at 20-24
(1981).
27. Pub. L. No. 89-750, 80 Stat. 1191 (1966).
28.Id.
29.Id.
30. Hendrick Hudson Dist Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 180 (1982). Note
the ESEA was further amended in 1968: Pub. L. No. 90-247, 81 Stat. 783 (1968), but
only resulted in minor technical changes.
31. Pub. L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 121 (1970).
32. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 180.
33. See Pennsylvania Assn. for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp.
1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), modified, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972). In what is commonly
referred to as the PARC decision, the issue of whether handicapped children had a fundamental right to education was first raised. PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 281-82. In a consent
decree, the state agreed to admit mentally handicapped students. Id. at 291. The Court
noted that such agreement was, "an intelligent response to overwhelming evidence." Id.
See also, Mills v. Board of Educ. of Dist. of Columbia, 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.C. 1972). In
the Mills case, the district court held that the exclusion of handicapped students from
public schools was unconstitutional. Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 878. In Mills, a class action
was brought on behalf of students with mental and physical handicaps. Id. at 866-68.
The claim was essentially the same as in P ARC: that handicapped children were denied
their right to education because of delays or avoidance of school districts to provide
public (financial) support for their education. Id. at 867-70. The Mills court agreed. Id.
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tionally protected right to public education. However, in San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,34 the United
States Supreme Court held that the right to education was not a
"fundamental" right. 31i The' Court rejected the claim that students have a right to an equal quality of education. 36
Despite Rodriquez, increased pressure for better education
from NARC and CEC motivated Congress to authorize funding
for 1974 and to initiate research on the particular unfulfilled
needs of handicapped children. 37 This action seemed to indicate
Congress was going to guarantee handicapped children an educational opportunity even though the Rodriquez Court apparently would not. 38
Thus in 1975 what is now The Education for All Handiat 878. It found that, under the fifth amendment's due process clause, every child in the
District of Columbia shall receive, "a free and suitable publicly supported education regardless of a child's impairment.'" Id.
34. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). The plaintiffs claimed that Texas's financing system for public education was a violation of equal protection. Id. at 1-12. The system was based primarily on local property taxes. Id. Thus, students in lower income neighborhoods received less funding. Id. The plaintiffs argued that education was a fundamental right,
and that inequalities in the distribution should be strictly scrutinized. Id. However, the
Court rejected these claims. Id. at 35.
35. Id. at 35.
36. Id. at 6-12.
37. See Burlington School Comm. v. Massachusetts. Dept. of Educ., 471 U.S. 359,
373 (1985) which provides:
The impetus for the Act came from two federal court decisions, Pennsylvania Assn. for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth ... and Mills v. Board of Educ. of Dist of Columbia which arose from the efforts of parents of handicapped
children to prevent the exclusion or expulsion of their children
from public schools. Congress was concerned about the apparently widespread practice of relegating handicapped children
to private institutions or warehousing them in special
education.
See Comment, Equal Educational Opportunity: The Visually Impaired and Public Law
94-142, 33 UCLA L. REV. 549 (1985) for a more detailed discussion of the history of
educating handicapped children.
38. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (Supp. 1986) which provides: "Congress finds that: the
special educational needs of such children are not being fully met; It is in the national
interest that the Federal Government assist State and local efforts to provide programs
to meet the educational needs of handicapped children in order to assure protection of
the law." See also 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (Supp. 1986) which states: "It is the purpose of
this chapter to assure that all handicapped children have available to them ... a free
appropriate public education which emphasizes special education and related services
designed to meet their unique needs."
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capped Children Act was adopted. 39 It set forth detailed guidelines for most aspects of special education. 40 By specifically reqUIrmg the subsidization of "related services," more
handicapped children have gained access to educational resources. 41 The related services provision, however, is much less
detailed than other provisions of the Act.42
III. THE CURRENT STATUS
Perhaps because of the ambiguous wording of the related
services provision, many different services have been rejected by
the courts. Two United States Supreme Court decisions have established the test for determining what will be declared a related service under the Act. 43 In the leading case, Irving Independent School District v. Tatro," an eight-year old student
was unable to voluntarily empty her bladder and had to be catheterized every three to four hours.411 The student was too young
to perform the catheterization herself and needed a trained
school nurse to assist her.46 In a unanimous decision, the Court
held that without the existence of this service, the student would
be unable to attend class, and thus would not have access to the
education she was entitled to receive. 47
39. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1461
(1982)).
40.Id.
41. Department of Education Seventh Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Education of the Handicapped Act, at 2 (1985). Each year Congress is
presented a report on the implementation of the Act. The report primarily deals with
statistical data indicating the number of students benefitting from the Act as well as
general budgetary data.
42. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1414 (1982). In this section, for instance, a detailed
formula is used to establish the percentage of funds attributable to each school district.
However, note that the Act fails to specify acceptable "support services" available to
handicapped children.
43. Irving Indep. School Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883 (1984); Hendrick Hudson Dist.
Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982). The United States Supreme Court has given
an opinion on the interpretation of the Act only four times. Related services were of
primary concern in the two cases mentioned above. The other two cases were Burlington
v. Department of Educ., 471 U.S. 359 (1985) (primarily dealing with the definition of a
"free appropriate public education") and Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984) (dealing primarily with the awarding of attorneys' fees).
44. 468 U.S. 883 (1984).
45. Id. at 885. The child suffered from spina bifida, a disease which causes orthopedic problems and loss of muscle control.
46. Id. at 885, 894.
47. Id. at 895.
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Tatro was one of only two United States Supreme Court
opinions involving an express interpretation of related services. 48
The Court developed a two-part test to guide lower courts confronting the same issue: 4s 1) Is the service a "support service ...
which will assist the handicapped child in benefitting from special education?"I1° and 2) Is the service a medical service that
goes beyond diagnosis or evaluation?1I1 Thus, a service which enables a handicapped child to simply remain in school during the
day will be deemed a necessary aspect of their IEP .112
In applying the test, the Court held that any health related
activities which must be performed by a licensed physician were
excluded. 1I3 Acceptable medical services under the Act, then, are
those that can be conducted by a lay person or school nurse. 1I4
Clean intermittent catheterization was therefore declared to be a
related service. 1I11
In Hendrick Hudson District Board of Education v.
Rowley,1I6 the Supreme Court held that the Act did not require
an IEP to include a sign language interpreter. 1I7 The Court reasoned that the intent of the Act was to open the doors of public
education to handic;:apped children, rather than to guarantee any
particular level of competence once inside. 1I8 This opinion acknowledged that a "free appropriate public education" (which
includes adequate related services) should merely confer a minimal educational benefit. liS These two cases failed to specify what
the expression "educational benefit" encompasses. 60 The result
48. See supra note 43 for a summary on the four cases in which the United States
Supreme Court has interpreted any provision of the Act.
49. Tatro, 468 U.S. at 892-93.
50.Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 891.
53. Id. at 892-93.
54. Id. at 893.
55. Id. at 895. See also Tokarcik v. Forest Hills School Dist., 665 F.2d 443 (3rd Cir.
1981), which also found clean intermittent catheterization as a related service.
Tokarcik, 665 F.2d at 444-46.
56. 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
57. Id. at 210.
58. Id. at 192. The Court found the current services adequate because the child was
making progress, even when compared to nonhandicapped children, without the aid of a
sign language interpreter. Id. at 209-10.
59. Id. at 207-10.
60. Id. at 202. The Court stated, "We do not attempt today to establish anyone test
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has been increased litigation on the issue.
Currently four types of services have comprised the bulk of
litigation in this area: medical services, therapeutic care, transportation and housing accomodations. The cases give some guidance as to how the Tatro test has been applied.

A.

MEDICAL SERVICES

The Tatro standard limits medical services under the Act to
those for evaluative and diagnostic purposes only.61 The Court
stated that the high cost of health care is a major reason for this
limitation. 62
In Department of Education, State of Hawaii v. Katherine
D.6s the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that having someone available who is capable of executing tracheotomy tube reinsertion (in the event it became dislodged) was a related service. 64
As in Tatro, it was viewed as no less related to the effort to educate than services that enabled the child to reach, enter, or exit
the school. 66

One recent case66 involved a handicapped student who required constant monitoring to keep her lungs clear. Such monitoring requires full knowledge of cardio-pulmonary resuscitation. 67 The district court found such "constant" care to not be a
service within the Act. 68
The district court stated that under Tatro, meaningful acfor determining the adequacy of educational benefits conferred upon all children covered
by the Act." Id. Irving Independent School District v. Tatro, 468 U.S. at 883 (1984).
61. Tatro, 468 U.S. at 891.
62. Id. at 892. "Although Congress devoted little discussion to the 'medical services'
exclusion, the Secretary could reasonably have concluded that it was designed to spare
schools from an obligation to provide a service that might well prove unduly expensive."
Id.
63. 727 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1983) cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1117 (1985).
64. Id. at 813.
65.Id.
66. Detsel v. Board of Educ. of Auburn Enlarged School Dist., 637 F. Supp. 1022,
1024 (N.D. N.Y. 1986).
67.Id.
68. Detsel, 637 F. Supp. at 1026·27. But see Katherine D., 727 F.2d at 813 (knowl·
edge of tracheotomy tube reinsertion was not seen as "constant" care).
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cess to education must be afforded handicapped children, yet
medical services which would entail great expense are not necessary.se It held that Congress did not intend to "maximize each
handicapped child's potential."70 Therefore the child's claim
failed the second prong of the Tatro test because the care would
be complicated and require the skill of a trained health
professional. 71

B.

THERAPEUTIC SERVICES

1. Physical and Occupational Therapy

Recently, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a
school district was not obligated to provide extracurricular physical activities, such as athletics and recreational activities to a
handicapped child.72 The court noted that because of "sporadic
behavior" and lack of interest, the child would receive no significant educational benefit from such activities. 73 Had some sort of
"benefit" been proven, the activities would have been required. 74
Although these extracurricular activites were rejected, it is
fairly clear that the Act requires some physical and occupational
therapy.711 The extent of these required services, however, was
recently scrutinized. 7s The case involved a child who had significant physical problems resulting from a motorcycle accident. 77
The issue was whether three one-hour sessions of weekly individual physical therapy, and one half-hour session of weekly
small group occupational therapy constituted related services. 78
Citing Tatro and Rowley, the hearing officer found that the
student would obtain a significant educational benefit from the
availability of these services. 7e The benefit would be the devel69. [d.
70. [d. at 1027, quoting Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ. u. Rowley, 458 U.S.
176, 199 (1982).
71. Detsel, 637 F. Supp. at 1026-27.
72. Rettig v. Kent City Sch. Dist., 788 F.2d 328 (6th Cir. 1986).
73. [d. at 332.
74. [d.
75. 20 U.s.C. § 1401(a)(17) (1982).
76. Mary H. v. Massachusetts, 1984-85 EHLR DEC. 506:340.
77. [d.
78. [d.
79. [d. at 506:343.
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opment of the ability to maintain balance and muscle functions
necessary to function in a public school environment. 8o The
therapist could also provide feedback to the school on the child's
progress. 81 The updated information would result in the most
effective IEP for the child. 82
In Maurits v. Board of Education of Hartford County,83 the
district court imposed an upper limit to the extent of subsidized
physical therapy. Because the student had already been "benefiting" from special education, and the therapy was to only
maintain his physical strength, the court disallowed it from his
IEP.8. The student was doing well academically and the court
felt that his impairment (mobility problems caused by hemophilia) did not affect his academic performance. 811
The physical therapy cases may be reconciled by the rationale in Tatro: Services enabling the child to gain access to special
education are needed, but resources should not be depleted by
attempting to reach anything more than a minimal benefit. 86

2. Psychotherapy
In Doe v. Anrig,87 the district court proclaimed psychotherapy and group therapy to be related services. The child was severely handicapped and manifested symptoms of autism. 88 Psychotherapy was implemented to improve the child's ability to
work in a one-to-one learning relationship by building self-esteem and developing competence in his areas of interest. 89 In applying the Tatro test, the court emphasized that the services
need not be primarily for educational purposes, but may merely
assist the child in benefitting from special education. 90
80.Id.
81. Mary H. 1984-85 EHLR DEC. 506:343.
82. Id. at 343.
83. No. 8-83-1746 (M.D. Cir. September 16, 1983).
84.Id.
85.Id.
86. See supra notes 43-60 and accompanying text.
87. 651 F. Supp. 424, 431 (D. Mass. 1987).
88. Id. at 426.
89. Id. at 427.
90. Id. at 430.
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Similar findings were reached in two cases involving children who were emotionally disturbed. 91 The courts found that
psychological services are required in order for mentally handicapped children to obtain an educational benefit. 92 The cost of
such services was to be provided by the state school boards and
not by the child's parents. 93
Psychiatric services, however, have not been deemed a required service. 94 For example, in Darlene L. u. Illinois State
Board of Education, the district court found that unlike psychologists and counselors, psychiatrists are licensed physicians. 91i
Consequently, this medical service could not be provided because it would extend beyond evaluative or diagnostic
purposes. 96

C.

TRANSPORTATION

The Act expressly provides for transportation as a "related
service."97 In Alamo Heights Independent School District u.
State Board of Education,98 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
reaffirmed this point by requiring the school system to provide
free transportation without regard to district boundaries. The
student's parents worked, consequently there was no alternate
means of transportation. 99 Unfortunately, the court failed to
specify acceptable limits in concluding that, "Unless the transportation request is shown to be 'unreasonable,' the Actrequires
that such transportation be provided as a related service. "100
91. T.G. v. Board of Educ., 576 F. Supp. 420, aft'd, 738 F.2d 420, (1983); Papacoda
v. Connecticut, 528 F. Supp. 68 (D.C. Conn 1981). In both cases, psychological services
were deemed a necessary part of the young student's IEP's. Both students were emotionally disturbed. T.G., 576 F. Supp. at 424; Papacoda, 528 F. Supp. at 71-72.
92. T.G. 576 F. Supp. at 424; Papacoda 528 F. Supp. at 72.
93. T.G. 576 F. Supp. at 424; Papa coda 528 F. Supp. at 72.
94. Darlene L. V. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 568 F. Supp. 1340 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
95. [d. at 1344.
96. [d. See also McKenzie v. Jefferson, 566 F. Supp. 412 (D.C. D.C. 1983), in which
the public school was not required to finance an emotionally handicapped student's
treatment in a psychiatric hospital. The treatment was deemed as medically related and
went beyond evaluative and diagnostic purposes.
97. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17) (1982).
98. 790 F.2d 1153, 1161 (5th Cir. 1986). Not only was transportation required, but
the court required the school district to provide a full summer program so the student
would maintain his level of competence.
99. [d. at 1155.
100. [d. at 1160.
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The transportation here involved a variance of only one mile
from the normal bus route. 101 The court never defined what a
"reasonable distance" would be.
In Pinkerton v. Moye,1°2 which was cited in Alamo Heights,
the court required subsidized travel over a distance of six miles
from the student's home to the facility where his IEP took
place. l03 No authority was cited that would act as a limit on the
district court's allowing further transportation distances.
One court10' refused to order reimbursement of the transportation costs to take a child to a treatment facility in an adjacent state over 400 miles away. The reimbursement was denied
even though this facility was used to reach one of the goals set
forth in his IEP. 1011
The burden of federal funding seems to be the critical factor
in this area. Reimbursement denials can only be justified in light
of the "minimal benefit" that courts will require. l06

D.

HOUSING ACCOMMODATIONS

Because of varied opinions, no clear trend has been established in the area of housing. The First Circuit Court of Appeals
has allowed residential placement under the Act in two cases. 107
101. Id. at 1156.
102. 509 l<'. Supp. 107 (W.D. Va. 1981). The court noted that it was appropriate, in
this situation, for the county to pay for the child's alternate transportation. Id. at 115.
The child's regular school lacked the resources the child required, but a different school
six miles away was sufficient. Id. at 110. Rather than pay for the child's public transportation, (which would take over 30 minutes per day) the first school district had to supply
the direct transportation. Id. at 115.
103. Id. at 115.
104. Cohen v. School Bd. of Dade County, 450 So.2d 1238 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3rd
1984).
105. Id. at 1239. The child's treatment facility was located in Georgia, but his family's home was in Florida.
Id. at 1239-40. One of the goals of his IEP was to develop satisfactory interpersonal
relationships in the home. Id. However, the court refused to allow travel compensation
under the Act. Id. Note that this case seems to directly contradict the Tatro standard of
only allowing "access" to one's IEP. See supra notes 43-55 and accompanying text.
106. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 190. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
107. Abrahamson v. Hershman, 701 F.2d 223 (1st Cir. 1983) (residential housing was
required to provide the student with the "least restrictive" learning environment); Id. at
227. Doe v. Anrig, 692 F.2d 800 (1st Cir. 1982)
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In Abrahamson v. Hershman/0 8 residential placement was
needed to provide the "least restrictive" learning environment
for the child. Similarly, in Doe v. Anrig/09 placement was provided after it was shown that the child would regress if removed
from the facility. Though residential placement in a private
school is among the services that states may be required to provide, if parents move the child from an acceptable public program to a private one, the state is not required to fund that
placement. 110
In a recent district court ruling,111 the Act was held not to
include the cost of placing a student in a private residence. The
child suffered from dyslexia and was attending a day school.ll2
Such placement, however convenient, was not necessary for the
child to obtain an educational benefit.ll8 Therefore, it is crucial
that the residential placement relate to an educational benefit
rather than be a response to a medical or emotional problem. lU
III. TRENDS AND ALTERNATIVES
Handicapped children face an array of social and economic
obstacles to a quality education. Consequently, services such as
transportation, basic health care needs, counseling and developmental programs become an integral part of an IEP. The benefits of the Act have been significant. Currently, federal grants to
state educational agencies exceed one billion dollars annually. lUI
Over four million children nationwide are benefitting from the
Act. 116
Unfortunately, because of the vague wording of the related
(residential housing was required after it was shown that the child would regress if removed from the facility). Id. at 808.
108. 701 F.2d 223 (1st Cir. 1983).
109. 692 F.2d 800 (1st Cir. 1982).
110. Ahern v. Keene, 593 F. Supp. 902, 913 (D. Del. 1984).
111. Adams v. Hansen, 632 F. Supp. 858, 867 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
112. Id. at 860.
113. Id.
114. See McKenzie v. Smith, 771 F.2d 1527 (D.C. Cir. 1985). See also Christopher
T. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 553 F. Supp. 1107 (N.D. Cal. 1982). In both cases,
the educational benefit/medical response distinction was the key issue.
115. Department of Education, Seventh Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Education of the Handicapped Act at 2, 59 (1985).
116. Id. at 2.
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services provision, school administrators, parents and students
are unsure as to what services may be incorporated into a child's
IEP. If the ambiguity is corrected, fewer conflicts in the establishment and modifications of a handicapped child's IEP would
arise.
The two pronged Tatro test is one attempt to reduce the
ambiguity.1l7 Meanwhile, the courts may use Rowley's minimum
benefit standard if they feel a service is too costly or
unnecessary. 118
By allowing financial ramifications to impact their decisions,119 the United States Supreme Court seems to contradict
the "findings" of Congress: that present financial resources are
inadequate to meet the special educational needs of handicapped children. 12o
Legislation which will enable school districts to tap alternative economic sources may help. In the meantime, state educational agencies have attempted to secure other state agencies'
cooperation to expand the services available to local districts. 121
Generally, the attempts have taken three forms: 1) increasing
access to another service system's resources; 2) negotiating to secure third-party financing from the private sector; and 3) joint
funding and cooperative programming arrangements with other
human service agencies. 122 The legislature could introduce incentives to ensure the success of these three fund raising supplements. The supplements would mitigate the financial burden
placed on the public sector.
Recent legislation has been enacted that may reduce the
long-term cost of educating handicapped children. 123 This provi117. See supra notes 43-55 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
120. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b)(8) (Supp. 1986).
121. Department of Education, Seventh Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Education of the Handicapped Act, at 20-26 (1985).
122. Id. See also 20 U.S.C. § 1444 (Supp. 1986) which seta forth the following budgetary amounta that will be used for research in these and other areas: For fiscal year
1987: 18 million dollars; 1988: 19 million dollars; and 1989: 20.1 million dollars. This will
not only help the related services problems, but the entire process of educating handicapped children.
123. See, 20 U.S.C. § 1471 (Supp. 1986).
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sion offers financial assistance to states which develop an interagency program of early intervention services for handicapped
infants, toddlers, and their parents. 124
Part of the policy behind this enactment was to reduce the
educational costs to our society, including our nation's schools,
by minimizing the need for special education and related services after handicapped infants and toddlers reach school age. 1211
This law was passed at the end of 1986. 126 Therefore, its beneficial effect on the related services provision cannot be measured
until today's handicapped toddlers become students.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Has enough been done to guide educators, parents and students facing "related services" questions? A standard that calls
for an "educational benefit" while keeping an eye on the price
tag is not an adequate guideline. In addition, the legislative history of the Act does not indicate that congress intended these
children to only gain minimal benefits.127 The current system requires general services such as transportation and limited medical care. Such broad categories, as well as insufficient funding,
create problems for those trying to establish an IEP that meets
the unique needs of a handicapped student.
124. 20 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (Supp. 1986):
It is therefore the policy of the United States to provide
financial assistance to States (1) to develop and implement a
statewide, comprehensive, coordinated, multidisciplinary, interagency program of early intervention services for handicapped infants and toddlers and their families, (2) to facilitate
the coordination of payments for early intervention services
from Federal, State, local and private sources (including public and private insurance coverage), and (3) to enhance its capacity to provide quality early intervention services and expand and improve existing early intervention services being
provided to handicapped infants, toddlers, and their families.
[emphasis added)
125. 20 U.S.C. § 1471(a)(1) (Supp. 1986).
126. Pub. L. No. 99-457, Title I, Sec. 101(a), 1986, 100 Stat. 1145.
127. Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 176, 212-16 (1982) (White, J.,
dissenting). The Act is "intended to eliminate the effects of the handicapped, at least to
the extent that the child will be given an equal opportunity to learn." See also H.R. 332,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1975) which provides: "Each child requires an educational plan
tailored to achieve his or her maximum potential."
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The significant options are as follows: 1) keep the present
guidelines and decide which services should apply on an ad hoc
basis; 2) request the legislature to reduce the ambiguity in the
wording of the related services section of the Act; or 3) hope the
Supreme Court develops a more specific test.
The ideal system, under the circumstances, seems to be one
that is "service based" rather than "categorically based. m28
Under this plan, school districts receive certain funds for each
special education class, development center, resource specialists,
instructional hour for service specialists, as well as base funds
for each handicapped student. After allocating these funds for
an IEP, any services that can be paid for may be incorporated.
Thus when determining which related services should be included in an IEP, the student's primary needs are resolved first.
The "selection" of services would not be limited to a predetermined general category.
Such a program could make a Rowley analysis unnecessary:
A sign language interpreter would be required if that was the
primary need for the student. The service could not be denied
on the grounds that it would be too beneficial for the student.
Michael S. Treppa*

128. See A.B. 4040, 1974 Cal. Stat. 1532. This established the California Master
Plan for Special Education. A service based system (whether mandated by Congress or
the Court) would be ideal because it would make services available based on need, rather
than from preexisting categories. Such a system allocates funding for an IEP initially,
and then any services which can be paid for may be incorporated into the specific IEP.
The result is that the students' primary service needs are met rather than limiting potential services to a predetermined list.
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1989.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol18/iss2/6

16

